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I. INTRODUCTION
"To Sue or Not To Sue, a Wrinkle In Federal Law Makes It Harder Than Ever
To Win a Malpractice Claim" - Newsweek. 2 "HMOs Claiming Immunity
Against Malpractice Suits" - St. Louis Post Dispatch. 3 "HMOs Want To Dictate
Care, Yet Avoid Malpractice Suits." -The Sacramento Bee.4 The popular press
is replete with stories of the application of the preemption rules of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 5 to managed care
plans and the resulting inability of individuals covered by ERISA regulated
plans to sue their managed care plans for damages caused by provider
malpractice.
The public demand is growing for the courts to "level the playing field" and
permit beneficiaries of ERISA regulated plans to sue their health plans for
malpractice and thereby afford the same opportunities to beneficiaries of
ERISA regulated health plans as are enjoyed by beneficiaries of health plans
not regulated by ERISA. 6 This controversy has also gained the attention of the
federal government with the United States Department of Labor filing amicus
briefs in several major preemption cases requesting that the courts permit
beneficiaries under ERISA regulated health plans to sue their plans for the
malpractice of plan physicians 7 and former Labor Secretary Robert Reich
speaking out in favor of the courts permitting ERISA regulated health plans to
8
be sued for physician malpractice.
This debate, however, often has focused narrowly upon the ability of
beneficiaries to sue their ERISA regulated health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) for malpractice or has failed to make distinctions between suits against
ERISA regulated plans for the independent actions of health plans in making
benefit determinations and performing utilization review and vicarious
liability suits against health plans for physician malpractice. While it is possible
2

Ellyn E. Spragins, To Sue or Not to Sue?, NEwswEEK, Dec. 9, 1996, at 50.

3

Robert Pear, HMOs Claiming Immunity Against Malpractice Suits, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 20, 1996, at 5B.
4
Frank H. Boehm, Editorial, HMOs Want to Dictate Care, Yet Avoid MalpracticeSuits,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 7, 1997, at B7.
529 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (West 1996).
6
See, e.g., Wendy K. Mariner, Liability for Managed Care Decisions: The Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and the Uneven Playing Field, 86(6) AM. J. PuB.
HEALTH 863-69 (1996); L. Frank Coan, Jr., Note, You Can't Get There From
Here-QuestioningThe Erosionof ERISA Preemption in MedicalMalpracticeActionsAgainst
HMOs, 30 GA. L. REV. 1023 (1996); Sylvia L. Wenger, Comment, New York State Conference
of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans et al. v. Travelers Insurance Company, et al.: Medical
Malpracticeand EnablingRegulation in States Again, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 131 (1996).
7
Briefs were filed by the U.S. Secretary of Labor in Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.,
57 F.3d 350 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 564 (1995), and Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637
(7th Cir. 1995).
8

See Spragins, supra note 2.
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that the courts can allow plaintiffs to bring suits for damages against ERISA
regulated health plans for physician malpractice, it is extremely unlikely absent
legislative change that the courts will allow plaintiffs to bring suits for damages
against ERISA regulated health plans for the plans' actions in utilization review
and benefit determinations. In addition, while permitting suits against health
plans arguably would be a deterrent to health plans engaging in overzealous
benefit denials and utilization review and would provide redress for those who
are injured by health plans' actions, permitting retrospective lawsuits is not
sufficient to provide truly effective remedies. Since benefit denials and
utilization decisions often result in the denial of coverage for life-saving
treatment, the desired outcome in most of these cases is for the beneficiary to
receive payment for the health care treatment in question so the treatment may
be obtained. While multi-million dollar judgments make headlines, the parties
involved undoubtedly would have preferred that payment for the treatment
had been available and that the treatment had been obtained and the life of the
loved one saved.
In addition to health plan beneficiaries needing an effective method to
compel benefits, also needed by those seeking medical care is an understanding
of the incentives at work for providers making health care decisions so patients
can factor in such incentives in making informed decisions about their own
health care. Many health plans are designed to provide economic incentives or
disincentives to encourage providers to make decisions regarding medical
treatment which reduce the health plans' costs. Beneficiaries need this
information to make informed health care decisions and to know when to seek
benefits from a health plan
This article provides a framework for an analysis of ERISA preemption of
suits against health plans. 9 The types of decisions made by health plans will be
categorized and ERISA preemption concepts applied to this categorization to
determine the points of inequity between ERISA regulated health plans and
non-ERISA regulated health plans. This article will then review the problems
inherent in relying upon the malpractice area as the primary remedy for
beneficiaries seeking care under ERISA regulated and non-ERISA regulated
plans and identify a number of key points for reform.
II. OVERVIEW OF RISK AND THE STRUCTURE OF HEALTH PLANS
Fundamental to understanding the ERISA preemption debate is the issue of
risk for payment of health care expenses. Behind the myriad of names for
managed care plans such as preferred provider organizations (PPOs), health
maintenance organizations (HMOs), point of service plans (POS), and others,
lies the entity which assumes the risk for payment of the health care costs. The
9
The focus of this article is to provide an analytical framework for the ERISA
preemption debate. It is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of the case law in this
area as there are others who have accomplished that task. See, e.g., Wenger, supra note

6- Terese M. Connerton, et al., Suits by Beneficiaries Against Plansor Employers to Recover

Benefits, CA 23 ALI-ABA 207 (1996).
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National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) defines a
risk-bearing entity as one or more persons that contract with individuals,
employers, or other groups to arrange for or provide healthcare benefits on a
10
basis that involves the assumption of insurance risk by the risk-bearing entity.
Simply put, which entity actually provides the funds that pay a claim, and if
the amount of money allocated on a monthly basis (premium, capitation, etc.)
is not sufficient to pay the claims for services, which entity is legally responsible
to pay the claims? The answer is generally one of four types of entities: a
self-funded employer, an insurance company licensed by a state; an HMO
licensed by a state; or a government such as the federal government through
the Medicare program.
The entity which assumes the risk is the entity that government regulators
are most concerned about regulating, for if the risk bearing entity is insolvent,
claims of individuals for the costs of health care services will be left unpaid.
The risk bearing entity is the ultimate payer of health care claims and is referred
to herein as the "health care payer."
1
Health care payers that incorporate utilization review 1 and other devices to
manage health care services in their plan design may perform this utilization
and management themselves or separate it from the risk bearing entity. At
times, the payer actually makes benefit determinations, provides the utilization
review, and other management of care or the payer may purchase these services
from another entity. Different types of payers may ultimately be bearing the
risk yet offer plans which look and function alike. For example, both an
insurance company and a self-funded employer may contract with the same
preferred provider network and offer an identical PPO plan. Similarly, a
self-funded employer may purchase the same HMO coverage that a non-self
funded employer chooses for its employees. Identifying the ultimate payer
may become particularly confusing because at times a self-funded employer
may contract with a licensed insurance company whereby the insurance
company supplies a provider panel, performs utilization services, and
performs certain third party administration. 12 A beneficiary may actually hold
an insurance card, and for almost all purposes, the beneficiary and provider
feel the "coverage" is by an insured plan, however, the ultimate payer is a
self-funded employer.
The following examples show three different managed care structures and
their possible contractual relationships to self funded and non-self funded
employers.

10

National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Draft Paper on The Regulation

of Risk Bearing Entities, 1996, pl n.3.
11See infra Section IIA2.
12

For a discussion of the structure of managed care plans, See Eleanor D. Kinney,
ProceduralProtectionsfor Patientsin CapitatedHealth Plans, 22 AM. J.L. & MED.301 (1996).
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With any of these examples, employees of both self funded and non-self
funded employers may be enrolled in identical health plans although the plans
are regulated by ERISA and the plans of
provided by the self funded employer 13
the non-self funded employer are not.
III. "MANAGEMENT OF CARE" AND TYPES OF MANAGED CARE LIABILITY

A. Management of Care
Concomitant with the rise of managed care in the delivery of health care, has
come a proliferation of types of managed care decisions. With the third party
health care coverage of yesteryear, patients generally obtained treatment and
a determination was made on a "retrospective basis" as to whether the
treatment was covered. Few plans had requirements for pre-approval prior to
receipt of benefits and it is doubtful whether some plans even had a mechanism
for making such a determination if asked. If a patient did not seek treatment
due to cost considerations she did so because it was clear from the description
of benefits that coverage was not provided or she made her own determination
that coverage did not exist under the plan.
The types of decisions made on a retrospective basis were generally limited
to whether benefits were available for a particular service and whether the
service desired was "medically necessary." Some benefit determinations were
simple, e.g., family planning services and "well baby" visits were covered; and
others were open to interpretation, e.g., if investigational treatments were not
covered, it was a particular desired treatment investigation. Medical necessity
determinations usually focused on whether the treatment was necessary at all
for a medical reason such as whether plastic surgery requested was purely
cosmetic or was required due to an injury. Seldom did medical necessity
determinations address the question of whether a particular treatment
modality was the most appropriate for a particular illness or injury.
If a physician ordered treatment and the patient received treatment but the
health plan later determined, on a retrospective basis, that the treatment was
not covered, the patient could challenge such a determination but if
unsuccessful, the patient would be responsible for the payment. Key to this
system, however, was that the patient usually received the care sought when
there was an ambiguity under the plan and payment issues were addressed
later.
The extraordinary technological advances in medicine and the development
of managed care have profoundly changed this primarily retrospective system
of coverage determinations. Central to most managed care systems is the use
of utilization review which involves the plan making determinations before
care is rendered as to what type of service and length of treatments are
necessary as well as determinations as to the most appropriate provider to
render the services. For almost all significant treatments except in emergencies,

13

See infra Section III.
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the plan must "pre-approve" the care. If the plan does not approve the care, the
patient must provide alternate payment if the care is to be received. As one
court has clearly noted, "by its very nature a system of prospective decision
making influences the beneficiary's choice among treatment options to a far
greater degree than does the theoretical risk of disallowance of a claim facing
14
a beneficiary in a retrospective system."
For example, a typical utilization decision made today by a managed care
plan is whether a particular mental health patient needs intensive
psychotherapy or whether drug treatment will suffice. If the plan determines
in its utilization review process that drug therapy is appropriate and the plan
will not pay for psychotherapy, the patient may forego expensive
psychotherapy if s/he must personally pay for the services. Another example
of a managed care utilization decision is a determination by the plan that a
particular procedure should be performed on an outpatient basis instead of an
inpatient basis. Thus, the patient will generally have the surgery performed on
an outpatient basis if the patient knows s/he would have to pay the costs of
inpatient hospitalization.
To carry out most managed care decisions, the health plan's authority to
make such decisions must be written into the plan design and therefore into
the health plan's contractual relationship with the patient. However, in order
to fully regulate the health care providers providing services under the plan,
the managed care plan must also have some direct control over the health care
provider. The plan accomplishes this by having an independent contractual
relationship with the provider. With the standard indemnity plans of years
past, the patient had the sole contractual relationship with the provider and
the patient then had an independent relationship with his or her insurance
company or self-insured employer which provided what services would be
paid by such insurance company or employer. The contractual relationship of
a standard indemnity plan may be graphically depicted as follows:
contract
Payer

Patient

(Self insured
employer-or
insurance company)

contract
(often implied/oral

sometimes written)
Health
care provider

Today, this relationship has vastly changed for now the provider has an
independent relationship with the payer (or if the payer doesn't provide its
own management services, with the managed care plan with which the payer
contracts). This contract may provide, among other things, that the payer or
managed care plan will provide utilization review and the provider will abide
by such review. This contract may also provide significant other restrictions,

14

Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1987).
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such as requirements that providers only refer patients to certain other
approved providers' 5 and may offer significant financial disincentives or
incentives to try to reduce the amount of referrals made to specialists or to
reduce the amount of certain tests or treatments which are ordered.1 6 Key to
enforcing these provisions is the crucial contractual relationship between the
payer or managed care plan and provider.
contract--provides coverage
Payer or
Managed Care
Plan

contractprovides for
payment and
utilization controls

Patient

I.,Contract

J

(often implied/oral
sometimes written)

Health Care

Provider

The contract between the payer or managed care plan and provider will specify
how the health care provider is to be paid and may specify that if the provider
continually violates the referral or utilization restrictions of the plan, then the
provider will be dropped from participation in the plan. Seldom does the
patient know that his or her health care provider has a contractual relationship
with the managed care plan nor does the patient know what is contained in the
plan's contract with the provider, although its terms may have a significant
impact upon how the health care provider renders care. Not only will patients
often not know of the terms of the contracts between the payers and healthcare
providers, the contract might prohibit the healthcare provider from sharing this
information with the patient. These prohibitions have become known in the
industry as "gag provisions."
B. Types of Managed Care Liability
In making benefit determinations and performing utilization review, the
potential liability of payers and managed care plans today can generally flow
from four broad categories: 1) benefit determinations; 2) utilization review; 3)
liability for provider malpractice due to the managed care plan's independent
negligence in provider selection and regulation including incentive systems
15 A typical contractual provision of a managed care plan requires all referrals made
by the physician of a patient covered by the plan to another physician be made only to
other physicians under contract with the health plan. This requirement is to be followed
regardless of the referring physician's medical judgment as to where a referral must be
made. See, e.g., GEORGE ANDERS, HEALTH AGAINST WEALTH, Chapter 5, Turning Doctors
Into Gatekeepers (1996).
16 Some plans provide that primary care physicians lose compensation each specific
time a referral to a specialist is made. Other plans set up "risk pools" of set-aside funds
out of which funds specialists are paid and if there are funds remaining after a certain
period of time, the physicians who were responsible for keeping the referral rates down
receive part of the funds. Some other plans provide other types of direct or indirect
financial incentives.
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designed to induce providers to reduce care; and 4) strict vicarious liability for
provider malpractice. The lines between the different types of liability are not
always precisely drawn, but are useful to review the different types of liability.
1. Benefit Determination
Health care plans regularly make decisions as to whether a particular
treatment is covered under the contractual provisions of the plan. A variety of
decisions are made in the benefit determination area including decisions as to
medical necessity, whether certain benefits are covered at all, and whether
treatment falls under investigational exclusions. When insured plans have
erroneously refused benefits and a beneficiary has been injured by not
receiving such care that should have been covered, plans have been held liable
for such determinations.
The most notable of plan liability cases is Fox v. Health Net of California.17 In
this case Mrs. Fox, an enrollee in a California HMO, was diagnosed with breast
cancer. She underwent two radical mastectomies and conventional
chemotherapy before being approved by the University of Southern California
Cancer Center as an eligible candidate for a bone marrow transplant. Health
Net denied the coverage on the grounds that bone marrow transplantation was
"investigational" and not proven effective in cases such as Mrs. Fox's. Mrs. Fox
raised funds herself for the treatment which she ultimately received after a
significant delay. Both Mrs. Fox and her husband sued Health Net for her
injuries caused by the delay in treatment. Mrs. Fox died before the trial. The
jury found that the delay in receiving the treatments contributed to her death
and awarded the plaintiffs $89 million in compensatory and punitive
damages.18 Therefore, absent any intervening law or regulation, health plans
may be held liable for damages caused by erroneous benefit determinations.
2. Utilization Review
Managed care plans are designed to accomplish what their name
suggests-they are to manage the care that is rendered. This means that the
plan is to determine if care is necessary at all and if so, what is the most cost
effective and appropriate manner for the care to be provided to the patient. By
definition the plan is to be involved in making decisions as to appropriateness
of care. Most managed care plans will contend that they are not making
determinations as to whether care can be obtained but are only making benefit
determinations as to whether the plan will pay for the care if delivered as
requested. As a practical matter, however, these determinations may be
tantamount to treatment decisions if the patient will not obtain treatment for
that which coverage has been denied, if providers refuse to provide the
treatment unless they know that the plan has approved the treatment, or other
payment is available.
17
18

No. 21962, unreported (Riverside Cty. Cal. Super. Ct. 1993).
This case was appealed and settled for an undisclosed amount.
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Where coverage decisions once were limited to whether a plan covered a
certain service and whether the services were necessary due to illness or injury,
now a myriad of decisions are being made including whether the services are
medically appropriate. Not only are decisions being made as to whether
treatment is covered and whether the treatment is medically necessary, now
decisions are being made as to which provider renders the treatment and in
what setting and how much service is to be rendered, e.g., how many days of
hospitalization. These decisions have a profound deleterious effect upon the
amount of health services that are to be rendered and indeed costs savings are
being realized, undoubtedly in part by care not being rendered.
When a plan makes a utilization decision, it can be negligent in making that
decision and that negligence can be the basis for liability. This idea that entities
making utilization decisions can be liable for such decisions began to gain
popularity after Wickline v. State of California,19 in which the California Court

of Appeals, while not finding liability for the reviewer, wrote the now famous
dicta:
Third party payers of health care services can be held legally
accountable when medically inappropriate decisions result from
defects in the design or implementation of cost-containment
mechanisms, as for example when appeals made on a patient's behalf
for medical or hospital care20 are arbitrarily ignored or unreasonably
disregarded or overridden.
Since the door was opened over a decade ago, there has been a slow21but steady
movement toward finding liability for faulty utilization decisions.
Note that with both benefit determinations and utilization decisions, it is the
independent decisions of the managed care plan that are in question. Provider
negligence does not need to be present to find the managed care plan liable and
solely responsible for the injury.

19727 P.2d 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. Div. 5 1986), dismissed, 741 P.2d 613 (Cal. 1987).
20

1d. at 670.

21

See, e.g., Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist.
Div. 5 1990); Salley v. E. I. Dupont deNemours & Co., 966 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1992); see
Robert C. Macaulay, Jr., Health Care Cost Containment and Medical Malpractice: On a
Collision Course, 19 SuFFoLK UL. REv. 91, 106-07 (1987); David D. Griner, Note, Paying
the Piper: Third Party Payor Liabilityfor Medical Treatment Decisions,25 GA. L. REV. 861,

907-11 (1991) (arguing that without liability for negligence in utilization review
decisions, third party payers have incentives to control costs but not to use reasonable
care in the decision making process); Laura Athens Mellas, Adapting the JudicialApproach
to Medical Malpractice Claims Against Physicians to Reflect Medicare Cost Containment
Measures,62 U. CoLo. L. REv. 287,316 (1991) (arguing that liability will reduce possibility

that poor medical decisions will be made in order to cut costs).
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3. Negligent Selection, Supervision, and Plan Design
In addition to holding a managed care plan liable for its negligence in faulty
utilization review or benefit determinations, arguably managed care plans
should be liable for negligence in selecting providers and for ongoing
regulation of physicians including compensation systems which might impact
a provider's decision making.
The doctrines of negligent selection and negligent supervision have long
been invoked to hold hospitals responsible for the acts of their medical staff
members. 22 In negligent selection cases, a party such as a hospital may be held
liable for not adequately evaluating a physician initially and for permitting that
physician to join the medical staff. Theoretically, the hospital has an
independent duty to the patient to properly evaluate the physician, for medical
staff privileges, and if the physician had been evaluated s/he would not have
been able to provide services at the hospital nor been available to do the harm
to the patient.
The doctrine of negligent supervision does not allege that the physician was
not properly selected but holds that the hospital should have taken acts or have
had systems in place which would have stopped the physician from doing
whatever caused the harm to the patient and that the hospital had such a duty
to the patient to have such systems in place. 23 With either of these doctrines,
while there was an independent duty of the hospital to the patient, the liability
of the hospital would not have arisen if the physician had not been negligent
as there would have been no harm without the physician's negligence. The
hospital's liability can therefore be characterized as dependent liability, because
although it is due to the hospital's own negligence, the harm would not have
been caused but for the provider's malpractice and the hospital's liability is
dependent upon a finding of physician negligence.
With the rise in managed care plans, there has been a slow process of
judicially extending the doctrine of negligent selection to the managed care
context and findings that managed care plans owe a duty to their patients to
solicit and retain competent physicians and when a plan fails in fulfilling that
duty and the provider also malpractices, the plan can be held liable.24
Similar to the duty imposed upon hospitals to appropriately supervise
physicians is the growing area of potential liability for managed care plans for
their role in affecting the providers' treatment decisions. Courts have begun to

22
See, e.g., Johnson v. Mesericordia Community Hosp., 301 N.W. 2d 156 (Wis. 1981);
Mitchell County Hosp. Auth. v.Joiner, 189 S.E.2d 412 (Ga. 1972); Albainv. Flower Hosp.,
553 N.E.2d 1038 (Ohio 1990): Rule by Rule v. Lutheran Hosps. & Home Soc'y of Am.,
835 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir. 1987).
23

See generally Martin C. McWilliams Jr. & Hamilton E. Russell, III, Hospital Liability
for Torts of Independent ContractorPhysicians, 47 S.C.L. REv. 431 (1996).
24

See, e.g., McClellan v. Health Maintenance Org. of Pa., 604 A.2d 1053 (Pa. Super.
1992), affd, 686 A.2d 801 (Pa. 1996); Harrell v. Total Health Care, Inc., No. WD 39809,
1989 WL 153066 (Mo. App. Apr. 25, 1989).
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recognize that design of physician compensation arrangements might
significantly affect the physician's treatment decisions and if so, the managed
care plans can be held liable for the harm to the patient resulting from the
physician's decisions. 25 In addition, plaintiffs are beginning to raise the issue
as to whether there is a duty on the part of the health plan to disclose to
26
beneficiaries financial arrangements which could affect a physician's advice.
While with negligent selection and supervision cases this issue is whether the
plan should have prevented the harm, with these negligent design cases the
question is whether the plan design contributed in causing the physician to
malpractice.
Similar to negligent selection and supervision, liability based upon
negligence in designing financial incentives is based upon the managed care
plan's own actions, however, the harm would never have come to the patient
but for the physician's malpractice and for that reason this liability can be
characterized as dependent liability.
4. Pure Vicarious or Derivative Liability
Vicarious or derivative risk occurs when a party is held responsible for the
actions of another based solely upon a relationship or an appearance of a
relationship between the parties. There is no independent negligence on the
part of the party held responsible. A common situation of this type happens
when a physician or other individual provider allegedly commits malpractices
on the premises of a hospital and the hospital is joined in the suit and found
responsible for the professional's malpractice. This issue of vicarious liability
also arises in a variety of other contexts, such as when healthcare is provided
through a managed care entity and the provider allegedly commits malpractice
and the managed care plan is joined in the suit. True vicarious or derivative
liability theories, such as respondeatsuperiorand agency by estoppel or apparent
agency, arise when the existence of a relationship between two parties gives
rise to the imposition of liability upon a party not otherwise responsible for the
harm in any manner.
The doctrine of respondeat superior imposes legal responsibility upon an
employer for the negligent acts or omissions of those acting within the scope
of an employment or agency relationship. It is well settled that any employer
of a health care practitioner, be it a group practice, healthcare facility, or

25

See, e.g., Pulvers v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 160 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d
Dist. Div. 4 1980); Sweede v. Cigna Healthplan, No. CIV.A.87C-SE-171-UCV, 1989 WL
12608, (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 2, 1989); Bush v. Doke, No. 86-25767-NM2, unreported
(Saginaw Cty. Cir. Ct. Mich. 1989).
26

Teti v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., No. 88-9808, 1989 WL 143274, aftfd, 904 F.2d 696 (3rd
Cir. 1990) (and its companion case, Erlacher v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., No. 88-9822, (E.D.
Pa. 1989)). (HMO participants brought actions alleging that their HMO failed to disclose
its financial incentive plan for physicians resulting in inadequate care. The case was
dismissed without addressing the plan's duty to disclose financial incentives to plan
participants).
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managed care plan, will be responsible for the malpractice or negligence of its
27
employed health care practitioners.
The doctrine of agency by estoppel holds an apparent principle liable for the
acts of an apparent agent even if no agency or employee relationship actually
exists. Although each state may differ slightly in its requirements for
determining agency by estoppel, four elements are generally necessary for such
a finding:
(1) There must be a reasonable belief that an alleged agent is
acting through the authority of the principal;
(2) Such belief must be generated through the acts or omissions
of the principal;
(3) There must be justifiable reliance on the appearance of
agency; and
(4) Injury must result.28
Courts have recently begun to recognize that a cause of action based upon
agency by estoppel maybe brought against managed care plans for the alleged
malpractice of participating providers if all the necessary elements are
present. 29
5. Continuum of Liability
The following shows the continuum of liability which maybe imposed upon
a managed care plan.
pure vicarious liabilit

plan's own neaience
I

II
Types of
plan
Liability

Benefit
Determinations

I

Utilization
Decisions

J

Negligent
Plan
Design

I

Plans negligence may solely cause harm
Provider malpractice isnot necessary

I
Negligent
Selection/Supervision
Regulation

Vicarious
Liability for
Malpractice

Provider malpractice isnecessary
'dependent liability"

27
See, e.g., Klema v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp. of Youngstown, 166 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1960);
Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., 135 N.E.2d 410 (Ohio 1956); Davidson v. Conole, 436
N.Y.S.2d 109, (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Hoffman v. Morre Regional Hosp., Inc., 441 S.E.2d
567 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994).
28
29

See McWilliams & Russell, supra note 23.

Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. 1988); Schleier v. Kaiser
Found. Health Plan, 876 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Dunn v. Praiss, 606 A.2d 862 (N.J.
Super. A.D. 1992), rev'd, 656 A.2d 413 (N.J. 1995); but see Raglin v. HMO Ill., Inc., 595
N.E.2d 153 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); and Chase v. Independent Practice Ass'n., 583 N.E.2d
251 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (recognized the existence of vicarious liability theories applied
to managed care plans but found none when the elements were not present).
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IV. ERISA PREEMPTION

ERISA was adopted by Congress in 1974 to be a comprehensive regulation
of employee benefit plans. ERISA carries this out by "establishing standards of
conduct, responsibility and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit
plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access
to the Federal Courts."30 ERISA does not require employers to provide benefit
plans but does strictly regulate how voluntary plans may be administered.
ERISA specifically regulates welfare benefit plans that provide employees with
medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits in the event of sickness, accident,
disability, death, or unemployment. 3 1 A plan is established when a reasonable
person can ascertain the intended benefits, class of beneficiaries, the source of
financing, and the procedures for receiving benefits. 32 Contained in ERISA as
Section 51433 is a broad preemption clause called by at least one court as
the most sweeping federal preemption statute ever enacted: Except as
provided in subsection (b) of this Section, the provisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and
all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan described in Section 1003(a)(3). 34
If ERISA applies and the plaintiff is constrained by his or her ERISA
remedies, then the problem is far greater than simply trying the case in federal
court, for a claimant whose state claims are preempted by ERISA may only
pursue claims in federal court and may only pursue claims for ERISApermitted
remedies. ERISA Section 502 provides the exclusive civil enforcement under
ERISA for plan participants and beneficiaries asserting improper processing of
claims and therefore Section 502 provides the exclusive remedies which may
be sought. Section 502(a)(1) provides that a plan participant or beneficiary may
bring a civil action under ERISA only for the following:
* to recover benefits due him under the terms of his plan;
* to enforce his rights under the terms of his plan; or
" to clarify his right to future benefits under the terms of the plan.
In addition to Section 502(a)(1), Section 502(a)(2) permits a plan participant,
a plan beneficiary, a plan fiduciary, or the Secretary of Labor to bring a civil
action under ERISA 35 to redress violations of ERISA's fiduciary responsibility
provisions. In contrast to section 502(a)(1), however, the cause of action to
redress violations of a fiduciary's responsibility is not intended to vindicate
3029 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (West 1996).

3129 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A) (West 1996).
32

Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1982).

3329 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (West 1996).
34

California Hosp. Ass'n. v. Herring, 569 F. Supp. 1546 (C.D. Cal. 1983), rev'd, 770
F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1985), amended,783 F.2d 946 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 904 (1986).
3529 U.S.C. § 1109 (West 1996).
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individual benefit rights, but rather to obtain plan-wide relief (e.g., restitution
to the plan for imprudent investment losses);36 and where relief sought is not
on behalf of the plan, section 502(a)(2) claims will be struck. 37 Therefore, a
beneficiary whose actions against a plan are preempted generally is left solely
with an action to recover benefits.
To determine if ERISA preempts particular state claims one must turn to the
38
interplay of state insurance law and ERISA. The McCarran-Ferguson Act
provides that the states have primary jurisdiction over the regulation of
insurance. However, in enacting ERISA, Congress determined that employee
benefit plans were best regulated by federal law free from state influence and
enacted the sweeping preemption clause of Section 514. Following the broad
preemption provision is the ERISA "savings clause" which provides that ERISA
does not preempt laws which regulate insurance 3 9 and then the "deemer
clause" 40 which provides that no employer benefit plan or trust covered by
ERISA shall be deemed to be an insurance company. 41 The application of this
triad of ERISA clauses to the health care context has caused one of the most
confusing scenarios of modem law. Courts have looked at each issue to
determine if it "relates" to a benefit plan in which case preemption applies, or
if it is an insurance issue which should be left to state regulation
To best understand ERISA preemption in the context of managed care, the
preemption decisions should be applied to the liability continuum of benefit
determination, utilization review, negligent selection and regulation, and
vicarious liability.

36

See, e.g., Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985); Corcoran
v. United Health Care, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992);
Walter v. International Ass'n of Machinists Pension Fund, 949 F.2d 310 (10th Cir. 1991);
Simmons v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 940 F.2d 614 (11thCir. 1991); Hozierv. Midwest
Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1990); McMahon v. McDowell 794 F.2d 100 (3d
Cir. 1986).
37
See Watkins v. Westinghouse Hanford Co., 12 F.3d 1517 (9th Cir. 1993); Tregoning
v. American Community Mut. Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 79 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S.
1082, (1994); Anweiler v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 3 F.3d 986 (7th Cir. 1993);
Richards v. General Motors Corp., 991 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1993); Horan v. Kaiser Steel
Retirement Plan, 947 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1991); Farris v. Century Planners, Ltd, 858 F.
Supp. 150 (D. Kan. 1994); Cairns v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 152 (N.D.
Ohio 1992), affd, 995 F.2d 1066 (6th Cir. 1993); Rosile v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 777 F. Supp.
862 (Kan. 1991), affd, 972 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1992).
3815 U.S.C. § 1011 et seq. (West 1996).
39

ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 USC § 1144(b)(2)(A) (West 1996).

40ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 USC § 1144(b)(2)(s) (West 1996).
41Statutory exceptions to ERISA coverage are found at § 4(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)
(West 1996), and include: governmental plans, § 3(32), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) (West 1996);
church plans, § 3(33), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33) (West 1996); plans maintained solely to
comply with workers compensation, unemployment compensation and disability laws.
See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983), and District of Columbia v. Greater
Wash. Bd of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992).
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A. Benefit Determination
Clearly, ERISA preempts claims in which a beneficiary seeks to recover
damages for improper benefit determinations. In Pilot Life v. Dedeaux,42 the
United States Supreme Court reviewed a case in which a beneficiary sought
damages under state tort and contract law from an insurance company that
determined eligibility for an employer's long term disability plan and limited
the plaintiff to his ERISA remedies. This reasoning has been applied by the
43
Supreme Court in the health care context in Spain v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.
where the Court found that the health plan's determination that a bone marrow
transplantation was not a covered benefit for the plaintiff's condition was
preempted by ERISA.44
This provides a profound dichotomy between ERISA regulated plans and
non-ERISA regulated plans in the area of benefit determinations. Those
individuals whose risk coverage is provided by insurance companies or HMOs
without the involvement of a self-insured company, often can sue and recover
full damages for any adverse outcomes due to erroneous and injurious benefit
determinations. 45 Those individuals covered by self-funded plans, even when
an HMO or insurance company administers the plan, are precluded from
bringing damage suits against the self-funded employer, HMO, or insurance
company for injuries sustained as a result of the HMO or insurance companies'
decisions. The only recourse of latter individuals is to bring a judgment to force
coverage of the health care treatment or to proceed with the treatment on a
self-pay basis and later bring suit for coverage of the actual costs incurred.
46
This dichotomy is best shown in contrasting Fox v. Health Net of California
47
and Cannon v. Group Health. In Fox v. Health Net, a beneficiary of an insured
plan was refused an autologous bone marrow transplant for breast cancer. The
delay in receiving the treatment, due to the plan's denial, was found to be a
contributing factor in the patient's death and the plaintiffs were awarded an
$89 million verdict. Contrast this with Cannon v. Group Health where the Court
of Appeals for Tenth Circuit held that ERISA preempted a clain for damages
for the death of plaintiff's wife after the health plan postponed
preauthorization of an autologous bone marrow transplant. The court held that
the plaintiff's only remedy was to have sued for the cost of benefits but since
benefits were never actually received, the plaintiff had no remedy.

42481 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1987).
4311 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1052 (1994).
44

Accord Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985).

45

See supra Section IIIB1.

46

See Kinney, supra note 12.

4777 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 66 (1996).
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B. Utilization Review

Similar to the area of benefit determination, the courts have been quick to
find ERISA preemption for health plans' utilization decisions. The case to most
vividly show the effects of ERISA Section 514 preemption on self-insured
managed care plans is Corcoranv. United Healthcare,Inc.48 a Fifth Circuit court

case. Mrs. Corcoran, a South Central Bell Telephone Company employee,
became pregnant. South Central Bell had a self-insured benefit plan which
provided medical benefits. The plan was administered by Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Alabama, however, the underlying risk was borne by her employer's
self-funded plan. A component of the plan required all hospital admissions to
obtain prior approval and continual approval was necessary to continue
coverage for the hospital admission. This utilization review was performed by
United Healthcare, Inc.. Mrs. Corcoran's physician recommended complete
bed rest during the final months of her pregnancy, and late in the pregnancy,
he ordered hospitalization so she could have round-the-clock monitoring.
United Healthcare, disallowed payment for hospitalization and instead
authorized ten hours a day of home nursing care. Since payment was not
authorized, Mrs. Corcoran did not stay in the hospital opting instead for the
home nursing care. During a period when the nurse was not on duty Mrs.
Corcoran's fetus died.
The Corcoran's sued United Healthcare and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Alabama for wrongful death among other injuries. The defendants claimed
ERISA preempted the Corcoran's claims leaving the Corcorans' solely with
their ERISA remedies to recover payment of benefits. The Corcoran's claimed
that Blue Cross and United Healthcare malpracticed and that such malpractice
was governed by state law and could be distinguished from benefit
determinations which are preempted. 49
The court refused to see the decision as solely a benefit determination,
recognizing that a system of prospective decision making influences the
beneficiary's choice among treatment options. However, the court found that
the decision of whether the action was a benefit determination was not
dispositive of the case and the question was whether the utilization decision
"related to" an ERISA regulated plan. The court held that the utilization decision
"related to" a self insured health plan and consequently ERISA preempted a
50
claim for damages.

48965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992).
49

Some states are beginning to address whether faulty utilization review can be
characterized as "malpractice" which is usually restricted to use in claims against
licensed health care providers. See ProviderNetwork Bill Sponsors Seek Middle Ground on
Solvency, Regulation, 6(12) BNA's HEALTH CARE DAfLY, Mar. 20, 1997, at 338-340;
Medicare HMO Regulation Consistent with Arizona Decision, Vladeck Says,-6(12) BNA
HEALTH CARE DAILY, Mar. 20, 1997, at 338-340 (describing legislative proposals in New

York, Alabama, and Texas).
50
See sources cited supra note 49. The court analyzed § 514(a) which provides that
all state laws (including state law claims) that "relate to" an employee benefit plan
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Cases have been quick to follow the Corcoran court's holding that ERISA
preempts cases involving faulty utilization decisions. For instance, in Kuhl v.
Lincoln National Health Plan of Kansas City Inc.5 1 the court held that while a
health plan's refusal to certify payment for a hospital outside the service area
delayed the plaintiff's heart surgery until his condition deteriorated to such an
extent that a heart transplant was his only option and contributed to his death
which occurred when such a transplant was not available, the utilization
decision "related to" the self funded plan and the suit for damages was
52
preempted by ERISA. Other courts have followed this reasoning as well.
In the cases involving utilization review, there may also be an issue of
Upon an
provider malpractice depending upon the facts of the case.
independent allegation of provider malpractice, the state claim against the
provider will not be preempted but the claim against the managed care plan
for the utilization review will be.
C. Dependent Liability and Vicarious Liability ForProviderMalpractice
The areas most active in ERISA preemption and the areas most open to
rejection of the preemption doctrine are identified as dependent liability and
strict vicarious liability, areas where provider malpractice is involved. This
potential liability is of two distinct kinds: strict vicarious liability, and negligent
selection, supervision or design cases in which an independent duty on the part
of the managed care plan is alleged but provider malpractice also is present.
While distinct types of liability, the cases have often raised both issues because
the issues are intertwined.
Plaintiffs are beginning to look to managed care plans as possible defendants
in malpractice actions on either the doctrine of strict vicarious liability or
negligent selection or regulation and courts are beginning to impose liability
upon non-ERISA regulated plans on the theory of negligent supervision and
regulation and vicarious liability.53 In the application of ERISA preemption to
these cases, courts have not been consistent on the issue of whether ERISA
preemption applies.
When the courts have been faced with a true vicarious liability situation,
where no independent negligence on the part of the health plan is alleged, some
covered by ERISA are preempted. The court relied upon the Supreme Court's holdings

that the term "relate to" is to be given its broad common sense meaning, such that a state
law 'relates to' a benefit plan in the normal sense of the phrase, if has connection with
or reference to such a plan." Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983). See also
District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992); Ingersoll-Rand
Co., v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
51999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993) cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1045 (1994).
52
Accord Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 1995); Jass v.
Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996); Garner v. Capital Blue
Cross, 52 F.3d 314 (3th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 189 (1995).
53

See supra Sections III (B)(3)-(B)(4).
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have treated such actions as not "relating to" the benefit plan; therefore, the
claims were subject to state claims and jurisdiction.54 A number of courts have,
however, held that even malpractice actions against health plans on vicarious
theories are preempted 5 5 because the action "relates to" the plan. These cases
permit the malpractice action to stand against the provider but do not permit
the plan to be joined.
While clearly not yet settled and not yet addressed by the Supreme Court,
lower courts seemingly move towards not finding preemption when the issue
is solely the provider's malpractice and whether the managed care plan is
vicariously liable. 56 Amicus briefs filed by the United States Secretary of Labor
have argued vigorously for not applying ERISA preemption in this arena and
recently courts have concurred that preemption is not appropriate. 57 Note,
however, that true vicarious liability cases have always been difficult to prove
except when a bona fide employer and employee relationship exists, and if
ERISA preemption is lifted and these cases are tried in state court, the recourse
provided may be more imagined than real.
When the action moves from one of pure vicarious liability into one of
negligent selection or negligent supervision, the courts become much more
conflicted. In two of the most recent cases, Dukes v. U.S. HealthcareInc.,58 and
Elsesser v. Hospital of Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine,59 the courts
consistently found that ERISA did not preempt allegations against a health plan
for negligent selection and supervision when physician malpractice was

54
See Prihoda v. Shpritz, 914 F. Supp. 113 (D. Md. 1996); Lafoy v. HMO Colo., 988
F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1993); Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa.
1990); DeGenova v. Ansel, 555 A.2d 147 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Kohn v. Delaware Valley
HMO., Inc., No. 91-2745,1992 WL 22241 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 5,1992); Jackson v. Roseman, 878
F. Supp. 820 (D. Md. 1995); Chaghervand v. CareFirst, 909 F. Supp. 304 (D. Md. 1995);
Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995); Elsessmer v. Hospital of Phila. College of
Osteopathic Med., 802 F. Supp. 1286 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Pacificare of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage,
59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995); Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Ill.
1994).

55Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc. 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996); Prudential
Health Care Plan, Inc. v. Lewis, 77 F.3d 493 (10th Cir. 1996); Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F.
Supp. 316 (D. N.J. 1993); Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO, 844 F. Supp. 966 (S.D. N.Y.
1994).
56

For a full analysis of the court's reasoning in these cases see, Coan, supra note 6.

57

See Brief of the U.S. Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Dukes v. United States
Health Care Sys. of Pa., 848 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1994), rev'd, 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 564 (1995), Visconti v. United States Health Care, 857 F. Supp. 1097
(E.D. Pa. 1994), rev'd, 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 564 (1995), and Rice v.
Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995); and see Dukes, 57 F.3d 350; and Prudential Health
Care Plan, Inc. v. Lewis, 77 F.3d 493 (10th Cir. 1995); see, also Seema R. Shahi, Comment,
Loosening ERISA's Preemptive Grip on HMO Medical Malpractice Claims: A Response To
PacificareofOklahoma v. Burrage,80 MiNN. L. REv. 1545 (1996).
5857 F.3d. 350 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 564 (1995).
59802 F. Supp. 1286 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
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present but reached their findings using different legal characterizations of the
managed care company's liability. The Dukes court found negligent selection
and supervision cases to be an attribution of direct liability on the part of the
managed care plan but found preemption to be inapplicable when the issue
was the quality of care rendered by the plan. The Dukes court therefore willingly
recognized times when preemption was not absolute. The Elsesser court found
that allegations of negligent selection and supervision to be purely vicarious
liability and not subject to ERISA preemption because they did not relate to the
plan.
Applying this reasoning down the continuum of liability, the Dukes court's
reasoning does give some precedent for lifting ERISA preemption in issues of
60
negligent plan design and perhaps even negligent utilization review cases.
The Dukes court, however, was careful to state that its holding was not to be
extended to the situation of a managed care plan's utilization review decisions
and should be limited solely to when the managed care plan also provides the
actual care provided, such as with an HMO. 61 The Elsesser court's reasoning
clearly does not provide the courts with the ability to lift preemption in those
cases where provider malpractice is not also alleged. 62 Despite the holdings in
Dukes and Elsesser, many courts have held that in negligent selection and
supervision type cases in which independent negligence is alleged on the part
of the managed care plan in addition to the malpractice of the physician, the
liability alleged "relates to" the benefit plan and ERISA preemption applies. 63
However the court chooses to characterize the liability in these cases, the
liability does not arise until after the provider has rendered (or failed to render)
care and provider negligence has occurred. While it is very unfair to allow
certain plaintiffs additional malpractice rights against an HMO or other
managed care plan and others to be foreclosed, the primary action against the
provider remains. The plaintiff is not usually left entirely without a defendant
and the outcome of these cases determines only if another defendant can be
added to the state court action. In these cases the care has either been obtained
or the physician inappropriately failed to render the care and what is being

60

See, also Dukes, 57 F.3d 350.
61Some commentators have speculated that the loosening of preemption in New
York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645 (1995) in which the U.S. Supreme Court was willing to speculate on congressional
intent in determining whether preemption applied may have the effect of eliminating
preemption in suits in which physician malpractice is alleged. See F. Christopher
Wethly, New York Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.:
Vicarious Liability Malpractice Claims Against Managed Care Organizations Escaping
ERISA's Grasp,37 B.C.L. REv. 813 (1996).
62ld.
63

See Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO, 844 F. Supp. 966 (S.D. N.Y. 1994) (where the
court held a negligent selection claim was a wrongly administered and preempted
benefit plan)- Butler v. Wu, 853 F. Supp. 125 (D. N.J. 1994); Altieri v. Cigna Dental Health,
Inc., 753 F. Supp. 61 (D. Conn. 1990); Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316 (D. N.J. 1993).
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argued about is whether the provider's decision was appropriate and whether
the managed care plan had a duty to take action which would have avoided
the provider malpractice. This is vastly different than the situation when the
care has been denied either through a benefit determination or utilization
review regardless of provider's medical judgment and the managed care plan
is the only defendant.
The following graphically shows the dichotomy developed due to the
application of ERISA preemption to the continuum of health plan potential
liability:
Plan liability
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Clearly there is a dichotomy between ERISA regulated and non-ERISA
regulated plans which is unfair in the types of redress permitted to injured
beneficiaries under the two types of plans. This unfairness, however, is
probably not going to be entirely corrected by the courts despite urging by the
Department of Labor and others. The courts may determine that ERISA
preemption does not apply in the area of vicarious liability for physician
malpractice and perhaps in the area of negligent selection and supervision of
health plan providers by managed care plans. Deteminations that ERISA does
not preempt these actions will allow the health plan to be joined along with the
provider in suits for provider malpractice. However, even without such a
determination, the injured patient is usually not left without a remedy for the
suit can be brought in state court for the malpractice of the health care provider
There is no precedent, however, for the courts to abandon ERISA preemption
in the area of benefit determinations and little precedent to abandon
preemption in the areas of faulty utilization review and plan design. In this
area, ERISA preemption appears solid and the application of ERISA
preemption leaves injured beneficiaries with no remedy. This area cries out for
congressional action to permit injured beneficiaries sufficient ability to seek
redress for injuries sustained by the independent actions of their health plans.
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V. A CALL FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION
Clearly, lifting ERISApreemption and permitting injured beneficiaries to sue
their health plans for injuries sustained due to either the health plans'
independent actions or the malpractice of the health plans' providers will "level
the playing field" and provide equal treatment for those enrolled in ERISA
regulated plans as well as those enrolled in state-regulated insurance plans.
However, equal treatment may not provide fair treatment as retrospective suits
for damages are only one type of necessary remedy for beneficiaries under both
ERISA regulated and non-ERISA regulated plans. While arguably large
damage actions will have a deterrent effect on overzealous utilization decisions
and benefit determinations, retrospective damage claims are not primarily
what is needed. 64 Beneficiaries need at least the following two things to fairly
obtain benefits due under a plan: first, beneficiaries need sufficient information
regarding the financial incentives impacting physician decision making so that
the beneficiary can make informed choices as to when to follow a physician's
advice and when to seek additional care; and, second, beneficiaries need quick,
effective mechanisms for challenging health plan' benefit determinations and
utilization decisions. In these areas, beneficiaries under ERISA regulated plans
might currently fare slightly better than beneficiaries under non-ERISA
regulated plans.
A. Revealing Health Plan FinancialIncentives To Patients
To date, there appears to be little to compel health plans to give beneficiaries
information regarding financial incentives or contractual requirements placed
upon health care providers, particularly physicians, to not make referrals, to
refer to only particular providers, or to limit diagnostic procedures or
treatments rendered. Patients accept physicians' advice without knowledge of
any such contractual restrictions or financial incentives.
A few legislative enactments have tried to address this issue, but they have
not provided for adequate disclosure. The federal government has recently
begun to require managed care plans, which cover Medicare and Medicaid
enrollees to give information regarding such plan incentives to enrollees, upon
request, but there are no similar provisions protecting non-governmental
enrollees. 65 Since many managed care plans specifically prohibit plans from
providing information to patients, a number of states have passed "anti-gag"
laws which prohibit contractual restrictions on a physician's ability to
communicate with his or her patients. 66 These provisions prohibit a managed
64
The application of caps on damage claims advocated by "tort reform" may even
vitiate any significant deterrent effect of retrospective malpractice actions.

6561 Fed. Reg. 13430, Mar. 27, 1996.
66
Approximately thirteen states have "anti-gag" rule provisions for state regulated
insurance plans. See "Anti-gag" provision appendix, page 108, Senate Interim
Committee on Managed Care and Consumer Protections, Report to the 75th Texas
Legislature, December, 1996.
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care plan from restricting provider communications and in the case of
governmental enrollees, compel disclosure upon request, however, neither
compel full, complete disclosure to patients.
In a very interesting case of first impression, Shea v. Esensten,67 the Eighth
Circuit recently held that the fiduciary provisions of ERISA requires an ERISA
regulated plan disclose to plan members any economic arrangements which
would influence a healthcare provider's judgment. The plaintiffs primary care
physician, who was under contract with the managed care plan, refused to
make a referral to a specialist. Unknown to the patient, the physician's contract
with the managed care plan provided incentives for physicians not to refer to
specialists. Despite the patient's initial request for a referral to a cardiologist,
the plaintiff accepted the primary care physician's advice that given the
patient's age, significant cardiac problems were not likely and a referral was
not necessary. The patient did not see a cardiologist and died of heart failure.
The court held that ERISA fiduciaries must communicate to beneficiaries any
financial incentives which discourage a treating physician from providing
health care referrals.
If this case is followed by other jurisdictions, ERISAplan members will begin
to receive full information regarding incentives and contractual obligations
placed upon physicians. There is no similar requirement for beneficiaries of
non-ERISA plans to receive similar information. This information is necessary
for any beneficiary to' make informed decisions and should be addressed
legislatively for ERISA regulated and non-ERISA regulated plans alike.
B. Challenge To Benefit Denials and Utilization Decisions

Beneficiaries under ERISA regulated plans and non-ERISA regulated plans
need quick, effective procedures to challenge benefit denials and utilization
decisions. These procedures should give beneficiaries the ability to
meaningfully challenge plan decisions in sufficient time so that if benefits are
to be obtained, they are obtained in sufficient time to impact the beneficiaries'
health. Currently some redress exists under the law but it is not adequate.
1. HMOs
Most HMOs will have a mechanism in place for resolving grievances. The
NAIC model HMO act which has been adopted in whole or part by most of the
68
states provides that HMOs must establish consumer grievance procedures.
These procedures maintained by the HMO may be effective, although
presumably since an HMO's license to operate in a state may be dependent
upon such procedures, an HMO has an interest in establishing a procedure
which will not be subject to extensive criticism.
67107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
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2. ERISA Plans
ERISA regulations require that each participant whose benefits have been
denied be given a reasonable opportunity for review of the decision. 69 This
review process has been criticized, however, in that the participant does not
have an automatic right to a hearing and the review can be performed by the
same party that originally denied the claim. 70
Since an administrative procedure exists under ERISA, the issue of
exhaustion of remedies arises. Courts have generally required plaintiffs to
exhaust their administrative remedies and go through the plan's grievance
procedure prior to filing suit.71 At least one court has held that exhaustion is
not required when the delay could result in irreparable harm to the
participant. 72 Requiring exhaustion of an inadequate administrative remedy
prior to judicial review will only further harm a beneficiary whose primary
interest is receiving coverage for needed services.
What beneficiaries of ERISA regulated and non-ERISA regulated plans alike
need is a quick, objective method of review of benefit determinations and
utilization decisions. This may be a quick recourse to the courts or an effective
grievance procedure where the decision is made by a party other than the party
making the initial determination. 73 Since by definition, however, successful
challenges to benefit determinations and utilization decisions result only in
payment for the services desired, beneficiaries may not have the resources to
pay the costs to challenge these health plan decisions. Undoubtedly, the small
number of cases judicially challenging benefit determinations and utilization
decisions to date is in large part due to the lack of resources of a beneficiary to
make the challenge, since even if successful, seldom will additional dollars be
awarded to the beneficiary to pay the cost of such challenge. 74 Additionally,
suit may not be pursued because it is determined that the time involved in
pursuing the action judicially does not make suit an effective remedy. Patients
in need of medical treatment and concerned about finding alternative sources
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of payment will not have the time or be willing to expend the funds for judicial
challenge. Any solution to a beneficiary's need for an effective, quick resolution
of benefit determinations and utilization decisions must address the cost of
challenge to be a meaningful solution.
VI. CONCLUSION

The effect of ERISA preemption on suits against health plans has certainly
created an unfair dichotomy between beneficiaries of ERISA regulated and
non-ERISA regulated health plans in their ability to retrospectively sue for
damages caused by the health plan's actions. Correcting the inequality created
by ERISA preemption would eliminate this inequity in remedies between
beneficiaries of the two types of plans. Full correction of this problem, however,
cannot be accomplished by judicial change alone and needs congressional
action.
Correcting the inequity caused by ERISA preemption, however, will still not
give beneficiaries of ERISA regulated and non-ERISA regulated plans the tools
they need to effectively obtain benefits due to them under their health plans.
To effectively obtain benefits due, beneficiaries need information regarding the
arrangements between their providers and managed care plans and they need
a quick, objective, and affordable method to obtain review of health plan
benefit determinations and utilization decisions.

